Between 1850 and 1868, the United States struggled through a long and bloody Civil War, attempted to reconfigure southern class and economic relations, settled much of the western prairie, and began the transition from an agrarian to an industrial society. During these two decades, Americans went to the polls, whether located in hamlets swarming with Union soldiers, rural churches set in the midst of the southern cotton belt, wooden cabins so isolated that even the nearest neighbors had difficulty finding them, or saloons in the most densely populated sections of great cities. Their votes have come down to us as election returns reporting tens of millions of officially sanctioned exercises in democratic participation. Neatly collated and arrayed in columns by office, candidate, and party, these returns are routinely interpreted as more or less accurate reflections of the popular preferences of the individuals within the communities in which they were made out. Seen this way, the returns themselves appear to constitute unambiguous and overwhelming evidence of the existence of a robust popular democratic system and ethos during the mid-nineteenth century. The purpose of this article is to suggest some important caveats that must attend this conclusion.
Although some of the literature on mid-nineteenth-century politics has focused on the ways in which party organizations persuaded voters to support their candidates, most work has assumed that the electorate, as a mass public, responded to party platforms. From this perspective, voters critically compared candidates and platform planks before choosing the alternative closest to their own personal tastes and policy positions.
1 Rational choice theorists, usually operating under strong assumptions characteristic of methodological individualism, are particularly prone to such interpretations. Platforms were written and candidates were chosen precisely because, in a rational and instrumental world, their party organizations would both find it easier to attract voters to their standard and motivate them to go to the polls. 2 In this world, men first reviewed the offer-
The American Ballot Box: Law, Identity, and the Polling Place in the Mid-Nineteenth Century
Richard Bensel, Cornell University 1. For example, William Gienapp stresses the "critical influence of state and local issues on mass voting patterns" in his study of the formation of the Republican party (The Origins of the Republican Party, 1852 -1856 [New York: Oxford University Press, 1987 , 7).
However, Gienapp also recognizes that even the most visible policy issues were beyond the full comprehension of most voters. In order to make informed decisions on the basis of their policy preferences, voters heavily relied on both party organizations and political ideology. With respect to party organizations, voters formed identities through which their "values and ideals became integrated thoroughly with [their] partisan loyalty, and parties thus came to represent in the popular mind certain fundamental attitudes independent of specific campaigns." Over time, these loyalties took on a life of their own for many voters, sometimes overriding their policy predilections if the two came into conflict. With respect to ideology, voters ranged "over a wide spectrum from a sound grasp of ideology at one extreme to only the dimmest comprehension of the issues involved at the other." Only a small minority could integrate "a wide variety of attitudes into a comprehensive and comprehensible world view." However, antebellum voters, in Gienapp's view, still possessed "meaningful political beliefs" because a "high level of abstraction was unnecessary for making intelligible political decisions." This was so because "voters generally shared the fundamental values that underpinned party ideologies in pre-Civil War America, even if they could not explain all the ramifications of their beliefs." Thus, all but the most uninformed antebellum voters were able to match up their policy preferences with the electoral alternatives presented to them at the polls (ibid., 8 -9) . On the saliency of local issues in northern elections, Gienapp cites Michael F. Holt, Forging a Majority: The Formation of the Republican Party in Pittsburgh, 1848 -1860 (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1969 Ronald Formisano, Mass Political Parties: Michigan, 1827 -1861 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1971 Paul Kleppner, Third Electoral System, 1853 -1892 : Parties, Voters, and Political Cultures (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1979 ; and Dale Baum, The Civil War Party System: The Case of Massachusetts, 1848 -1876 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1984 .
2. Barry Weingast provides a particularly apt example in his "Political Stability and Civil War: Institutions, Commitment, and ings presented by the various parties, then chose one of the parties to support, decided whether or not to participate in the election, and then voted or failed to vote, as the case might be.
As autonomous, rationally calculating decisionmakers, many nineteenth-century voters undoubtedly behaved in just that fashion. Other men, those who operated upon a different model, are usually slighted in these accounts; while not quite aberrations, they are not the active agents in the political narrative either. The largest group, from this perspective, was the mass of party loyalists, those who made parties into more or less sacred cultural icons.
3 Such men ceased to explore or entertain the possibility of voting for an opposition party, regardless of the issues raised in an election or the characteristics of the candidates. Somewhat smaller groups of men gave up their roles as autonomous, rationally calculating decision-makers, at least in the sense of critically evaluating issues and candidates, when they accepted bribes or favors in return for their vote. Petty patronage, for example, turned many a voter's head, often transforming him into an active agent for the party that gave him a government job or contract. Even with these exceptions, however, the primary model, with its strong emphasis on the formation of individual preferences as the animating force behind electoral politics, still dominates most interpretations of American party competition in the nineteenth century.
While this vast literature on party competition and electoral politics tells us a great deal about the ways in which party organizations and candidates viewed the mass electorate in the nineteenth century, we know very little about how or why ordinary men participated in elections. Put another way, we know much more about the kind of strategies parties used in campaigns and the types of inducements they offered at the polls than we do about why ordinary voters responded to these strategies and inducements. 4 The best way to recover the motivations of ordinary voters would be to interview them as they went to the polls. This, of course, is not possible; however, there is an alternative.
ELECTION CASES
The most detailed reports of the motivations and behavior of ordinary voters in the mid-nineteenth century appear in hearings conducted in connection with contested congressional elections. 5 Under the Constitution, both chambers of Congress are empowered to judge the qualifications of their members, including whether they were duly elected by their constituencies. Under that power, the House of Representatives heard hundreds of appeals by losing congressional candidates during the nineteenth century. In these appeals, the losing candidate would claim that one or more abusive practices in the conduct of the election had cost him his seat and urged that the House overturn the result, seating him in place of the winner certified by his state. In a majority of these cases, the House conducted hearings in the congressional district from which the appeal was made. The losing candidate presented witnesses and other evidence of abuses at the polls; the winner attempted to rebut this testimony with his own witnesses and evidence. In all these hearings, the witnesses were sworn. In many of them, a local judge would preside over the proceedings. While there is abundant evidence of fraud and violence in the transcripts, equally relevant descriptions of routine or normal election practices frequently appear as well. Throughout his article, Weingast assumes that antebellum voters held more or less fixed policy preferences which were only engaged (i.e., became the basis of voting decisions) when political parties presented platforms containing competing positions on these issues to the electorage. Although the primary purpose of his article is to analyze the implications of the "balance rule" between slave and free states in the U.S. Senate, he suggests that alternative explanations of partisan strategy and influence in electoral politics, such as those which stress personal identification with one or the other of the major parties, should be subordinated to a more instrumental view of voter behavior.
3. Many scholars have viewed, as did contemporary observers, party identity and allegiance as a birthright inheritance for nativeborn Americans and a baptism into ethnic solidarity for immigrants. For exhaustive reviews of the literature on nineteenth-century parties and the organizing role they played at all levels of American politics, see Ronald P. Formisano, "The 'Party Period' Revisited"; Mark Voss-Hubbard, "The 'Third Party Tradition' Reconsidered: Third Parties and American Public Life, 1830-1900"; and Michael F. Holt, "The Primacy of Party Asserted," Journal of American History 86 (1999): 93-120, 121-50, 151-57. 4 . In their thick description of elections in the nineteenth century, Glenn Altschuler and Stuart Blumin provide numerous accounts of election practices, particularly enticements offered voters by party agents at the polls. However, almost all of their examples describe incidents from the point of view of these agents or other party elites (such as newspaper editors or party leaders). Ordinary voters rarely give their own reasons for accepting such inducements or explain why they bothered to attend the polls in the first place. See, for example, Rude Republic: Americans and Their Politics in the Nineteenth Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2000), 68, 70-82.
5. These hearings were printed in the permanent Serial Record of the U.S. Congress as Miscellaneous Documents collected in the annual volumes of Reports to the House of Representatives. These are cited in this article by volume (e.g., "SR 1269" refers to volume 1269 of the Serial Record set), followed by the title of the contest (e.g., Contested Congressional Election in the Eighth District of New York), the number of the document (e.g., MD 7), the cited pages, and the contestants and the date of the election (e.g., "William E. Dodge vs. James Brooks, Nov. 8, 1864"). Subsequent references will include only the SR, MD, and page numbers.
6. While Mark Summers reasonably concluded that the actual extent of electoral fraud will never be known, he did say that What can be said with certainty is that in many elections, there was enough manipulation of the voters or their ballots to affect the result; that in private all parties acknowledged its existence and most of them abetted it in one way or another; that it was worse in From these hearings, we can reconstruct events that typify actual practices in and around the polling place. Many of the accounts that can be retrieved in this fashion cannot be independently confirmed. A few of them are probably false, fabrications made of whole cloth intended to support the claims of the seated member or the challenging contender. Others equally probably involve exaggerations of events, particularly the significance or frequency of abuses in the conduct of elections. But the vast majority appear, to this observer at least, to be the honest renderings of common men and, sometimes, women who, from all appearances, were not equipped to understand the consequences of their testimony; even if they had been willing to twist the truth in favor of their party's interest, these witnesses would not have known how to do so.
Many witnesses in fact corroborated, directly or indirectly, accounts given by witnesses for the opposition. In other instances, their simple narratives of how they came to be at the polls and what happened once they arrived only bore tangentially, if at all, on allegations of irregular or fraudulent election procedures. For some witnesses, merely reporting their experiences in a way that made sense to themselves, let alone their audience, was a struggle. For others, those more aware of the political significance of the practices normally associated with the polling place, the narratives they gave were probably accurate aside from the one possible violation to which their testimony pointed. In almost all cases, these ordinary voters, as witnesses, appear to have been more concerned with how they themselves appeared to the audience attending the hearing than whether their testimony helped or harmed the contestant who had summoned them.
Aside from the testimony itself, there are several possible sources of bias in the hearings. One of these arises out of an imbalance in geographical and temporal coverage. Where elections were not contested, hearings were not held and, thus, we have no testimony. Between 1850 and 1868, hearings were conducted in forty-eight contested elections (see Table  1 ).
7 When printed as formal reports to the House, [13] [14] . I originally intended to continue the analysis into the 1870s or beyond but chose to stop in 1868 for several reasons. The most important was that I uncovered much more geographical and temporal variation in election practices than I had expected. In order to fully present the evidence that I had unearthed, I had to contract the scope of the study. The second reason was that southern elections during Reconstruction were, even given this variation, just very different these hearings and the evidence associated with them occupy a little over 16,000 pages. In terms of temporal distribution, the evidence is fairly well balanced. The antebellum period, for example, is represented in fourteen contests containing just under 6,000 pages (29 and 37 percent, respectively). The Civil War years from 1861 to 1865 produced seventeen contests and 4,000 pages of testimony (35 and 25 percent). In the postwar period from 1866 to 1868, there were also seventeen contests, but the testimony, taking up over 6,000 pages, was more extensive (35 and 38 percent). Because the number of hearings and the pages of testimony gradually increased over the period, the evidence is slightly tilted toward the later years, particularly after the war ended. In terms of spatial distribution, thirteen state and territories are represented in the hearings. The state of Missouri led the list with twelve contests and over 3,500 pages of testimony (25 and 22 percent of the total, respectively). Pennsylvania and Kentucky were also over-represented with Maryland, Ohio, and New York somewhat farther back. New England was seriously under-represented, and no contested elections at all emerged from the Deep South. While these might be serious problems, the balance between the nation's great sections was still fairly representative. Twenty-one of the contests and a little over 8,000 pages of testimony record behavior at polling places in the slave states (44 and 51 percent, respectively); the corresponding totals for the free states are, of course, the inverse (56 and 49 percent). In terms of urban-rural composition, hearings were held for elections in Baltimore, Boston, Cincinnati, New York, Philadelphia, and St. Louis, as well as rural districts for almost all the states and territories on the list.
Another possible source of bias is that these hearings were, in fact, held when elections were contested. Peaceful, routinely conducted elections have occasioned little comment throughout American history. In this respect, they are like many mundane, familiar aspects of social life; they become important, and thus recorded for posterity, only when they are spectacularly violated in one way or another. Then, and only then, is normal practice set down as a foil against which abuse is demonstrated. In practice, the fact that an election was contested meant that the challenger (and his allies) felt they could present enough evidence of fraudulent or otherwise illegal practices to either overturn the official result or, at least, embarrass the opposition. However, this selection bias only pertains to the challenger's side in the hearings because the victor usually strove to present the same election, including voting practices and the conduct of election officials, as more or less normal or routine. In some cases, the victor would impeach the results in precincts which the challenger had carried; in such instances, they would trade positions on whether or not the election was routinely conducted in those precincts.
For the most part, however, we are not interested in the merits of the contest. What is important is how they (the witnesses for the winner and the challenger) described what a normal election should look like, the physical and sociological setting in which the polling place was located, and the actual texture of transactions between voters, party agents, and election officials. There is thus little reason to "take sides" in these cases (e.g., judging whether or not the challenger presented strong evidence in the hearings). We can also reject testimony that was effectively refuted by other witnesses. However, because witnesses were under oath, we may assume they are reliable, at least in the sense that their testimony was not often convincingly challenged by the opposition.
In sum, the evidence which can be drawn from the hearings is neither perfectly distributed spatially or temporally nor entirely free from bias. These flaws, however, are strongly countered by what they do contain: extended, detailed accounts of the personal experiences of ordinary voters in and around the mid-nineteenth century polling place. 8 As evidence for a social history of democracy, the testimony contained in these hearings is simply unmatched in the vast archives of American political development. 9 4 RICHARD BENSEL from southern elections before the war or northern elections at any time. The hearings, for example, reveal an unprecedentedly high level of social and economic intimidation in and around the polls. In addition, while a huge volume of evidence was presented in the hearings, much of this testimony, particularly with respect to freedmen, is second-or third-hand (often given by white Republican officials or politicians). There is comparatively little first-hand description of the behavior or attitudes of the common voter. What this testimony describes is not so much the practices in and around the polling place as a kind of social and political war between white Democrats and black Republicans in which the polling place was merely one site of conflict. Much of this testimony is in fact extremely important as a basis for reconsidering the Reconstruction period. (For example, the ubiquity of economic intimidation strongly suggests that only a thorough redistribution of wealth could have prevented the ultimately victorious resurgence of white Democrats in the region.) But the evidence also indicates that southern elections after the war must be treated separately. For these reasons, only northern contests were analyzed during the postwar period, and the study ends in 1868 when southern states began to reenter the Union.
8. Descriptions of polling places -the physical and social settings in which these events occurred -are even more uncommon. For two particularly evocative exceptions, see C. Vann Woodward's description of fraudulent conduct of the 1892 election in Augusta, Georgia, in his Tom Watson: Agrarian Rebel (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), 241-42, 269-71; and William Ivy Hair, Carnival of Fury: Robert Charles and the New Orleans Race Riot of 1900 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1976), 29. 9. Although the hearings also contain hundreds of pages of additional evidence such as the names recorded in poll books and official notices associated with the appearances of witnesses, most of the testimony is narrowly focused on the experiences of ordinary voters as they approached the voting window or loitered in the immediate vicinity of the polling place. Aside from isolated anecdotes in personal memoirs or the rare entry in diaries, there is just no other source of such information in the historical record. The evidence and anslysis in this article will be expanded upon in a
A FRAMEWORK FOR DESCRIBING NINETEENTH-CENTURY ELECTION PRACTICE
The rich descriptions in these hearings allow the construction of a theoretical framework resting on the actual practice of elections, especially the procedures and routines in and around the polling place. 10 Analysis of this practice begins by focusing on three aspects of the context within which the polling place is located. The first is the physical setting: the kind of building in which the voting is done, the type of neighborhood in which the polling place is located, and where the ballot boxes are situated with respect to election officials and voters. A second, equally important aspect of the polling place is the sociological composition of the community in which the voters reside: the ethnic and racial identities of the residents, the type of economy from which they draw their livelihood, and whether or not the average voter can read or write. Here we should also include the conditions under which the election is conducted; the most important of these conditions involve social violence in the form of guerilla raids, civil war, urban riots, racial and ethnic persecution, and military rule. Violence in and around the polls was not rare in the nineteenth century, and this dimension cannot be ignored in setting out our framework.
The final elements that must find a place in our analytical framework are the laws regulating elections.
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These include the statutes restricting voter eligibility, empowering election judges and clerks, and shaping the way in which voters indicate their choice of candidates. Such laws structured the act of voting by defining the boundary between legitimate and illegitimate practice at the polls. For various reasons, these laws compelled election officials to exercise broad discretion in the determination of voter eligibility and other aspects of the election process. 12 The exercise of this discretion, embedded in the social understandings of the community in which the voting took place and influenced by the partisan interests of the officials themselves, often determined whether and how the preferences of individual voters were translated into a vote. 12. Election officials usually had at least some knowledge of the laws under which voting would be conducted but tended to skirt formality whenever that seemed to conflict with normal practice or custom. At many polling places, however, books or pamphlets containing the laws regulating elections were available, and those dissenting from the decisions of officials could and did make use of them. Even in these cases, appeal to the letter of the law was not always effective. 13. Like Richard P. McCormick noted when describing his own work almost four decades ago, my interpretation of the role of party organizations "is admittedly unconventional, and may well be confusing or disappointing to those who perceive parties only in terms of doctrines or constituent groups." McCormick went on to align his study with Maurice Duverger in viewing American parties as "above all electoral machines, engaged in nominating and electing candidates" and in an "insistence that parties must be studied systematically in terms of their structures and that the structures of parties are profoundly affected by the constitutional and legal environment within which they evolve" (Second American Party System, 4). The book McCormick was referring to was, of course, Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (New York: John Wiley, 1963) . While McCormick was certainly correct in situating party formation and organization within an historical legal context (a perspective which most subsequent political historians have neglected), he did not place that experience within a material and sociological environment in which election laws were compelled to conform to a physical and social reality. When this is done, we can see that the party system was also shaped by the sheer social and material physicality of the American polling place. How much this was the case apparently varied quite a bit in time and space.
THE PHYSICAL SETTING OF THE POLLING PLACE
Almost all polling places in the United States are now located in government buildings, often schools. In the nineteenth century, there were far fewer government buildings than there are today. For that reason, most elections were held in privately owned structures. The one almost universal exception was the county courthouse in which was located the polling place for what was usually the largest town in the county. But out in the country, where most of the people in the United States lived, voting was conducted in barns, private homes, country stores, and churches -almost anything that could separate voters from the election officials and the ballot boxes they tended. Out on the frontier, where buildings were even harder to find, votes were sometimes cast in sodhouse saloons, sutler stores in army forts, the front porches of adobe houses, and temporary leantos thrown together at desolate desert crossroads. In the larger cities, fire stations, warehouses, and livery stables were commonly used. One of the most common venues was liquor establishments.
14 In some saloons, cloth sheets would be raised around the area in which voting was done so that patrons could drink while the election was held. Such an arrangement made an election noisy and, sometimes, violent.
Regardless of the type of building used, the vast majority of polling places were set up along a common pattern. The most important feature was the voting window through which tickets were received. 15 The voting window separated voters from election officials, who occupied what was, in most cases, a large room. Voters remained in the street, courtyard, or empty lot adjoining the building. The voting window was usually about five feet or so off the ground, high enough to restrict access to the election officials receiving tickets but not so high as to make it impossible for short voters to hand in their votes. Men presented themselves to the election judges at this window, handing their tickets to the judges. The judges deposited the tickets in a ballot box which was out of reach but usually in sight of the voters. Underneath the window there was almost always a small platform, approximately a foot high and maybe a yard wide. To address the voting window and thus attract the attention of election officials, the voter had to ascend this platform. While this physical arrangement protected election officials from the jostling of partisans outside the building, it also exposed voters to the crowd around the polls. 16 The platform became the prime site of contestation as the dominant party attempted to take possession, refusing access to all but those who seemed certain to vote their way.
From a contemporary perspective, the layout of the nineteenth-century polling place may seem rather odd. The major purpose of this arrangement was to separate the public from the election officials. Although police sometimes monitored the polling place, arresting those who were particularly violent, the public space outside the voting window was usually anarchic.
17 Almost anything was permitted in this public space in terms of speech, electioneering, and, all too often, physical intimidation. Under the law and almost inevitably in practice, election officials had no authority to maintain order outside the voting window. This, in many instances, was for their own protection because the kinds of physical and verbal 6 RICHARD BENSEL 14. Saloons were the most important gathering places for immigrants in the mid-nineteenth century and thus primary centers for their political mobilization as voters. For this reason, many immigrant political office holders owned drinking establishments, and, at least in New York, almost nine of every ten polling places in immigrant neighborhoods were saloons (Tyler Anbinder, Nativism Oct. 9, 1866) . In Pennsylvania, the ballot boxes were often stored, after the election, at the taverns that had served as polling places. In one instance, for example, they were kept in the garret of "Price's tavern." In another case, the boxes and their tickets were preserved in "the public house of Samuel Barndt." (SR 1199: Contested Congressional abuse meted out to potential voters could also be aimed at them. 18 Inside the polling place, the ballot boxes were usually situated on tables at least several feet away from the voting window. The officials, called "judges of election," would receive tickets from voters who presented themselves at the voting window and deposit them in the boxes. At the same time, "clerks of election" would record the names of the voters, as relayed to them by the judges. The clerks usually sat at the same tables that supported the ballot boxes, though the election judges usually stood.
19
Because the floor of the building (if it had a floor) was usually higher than the platform outside the window, the election judges looked down upon those who presented themselves as voters. This was clearly an advantage in more boisterous precincts, where voters or other bystanders might attempt to grab an official's arm or punch him in the face. In any case, the height of the window, which was still about three feet or so from the perspective of those inside the room, and the constant moving back and forth between the window and the ballot boxes made standing more or less a necessity for election judges.
To summarize, the voting window, set in the outside wall of a building, separated election officials from voters. Inside the polling place, the election process was usually quiet and orderly, with officials and ballot boxes efficiently arranged within an enclosed room. The public space outside the window, on the other hand, was anarchic with only minimal attempts at law enforcement. 20 Although most nineteenth-century elections were peaceful, a very sizable minority were conducted in situations where physical and verbal intimidation shaped the public space outside the voting window. In those cases, election judges usually attempted to preserve public order inside the building up to but not beyond the voting window itself.
PARTY TICKETS
Much of the arrangement of the polling place was dictated by just one aspect of elections: the body of laws regulating what were called "party tickets." A party ticket listed the candidates offered for election by one of the political parties in that community. Most tickets were printed on white paper of a quality very similar to newspaper. In fact, many of them were printed in newspapers; voters would clip them out and turn them in to election judges as their votes.
Most tickets would list all the candidates offered by a party in that election district in what was sometimes a very long strip. However, some states required separate tickets for every office up for election. In those states, voters would present what were called "bundles" of tickets that the election judges would then distribute among the various ballot boxes. Either way, it was the responsibility of the parties, as private organizations, to provide these tickets to their supporters.
21
This meant that the parties had to both print and distribute tickets to the public. This responsibility, in turn, compelled parties to station their own partisans at each precinct in order to distribute tickets and otherwise make certain that their supporters would be able to vote.
22 These partisans usually mingled with
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18. Even so, election judges could be so intimidated by the crowd outside that they would accept fraudulent votes. In one Philadelphia precinct in 1868, for example, a man named George Swartz approached the voting window and gave his name as "John Noble," evidently intending to vote at least twice in the election. When one of the inspectors recognized him and called him by his real name, the man went away. Later, Swartz returned and again attempted to vote, this time under his real name. Upon questioning, however, he revealed that he was not a resident of the precinct and therefore was not qualified to vote at that polling place. The inspector so informed the judge but, when the crowd outside raised a row and noise and the judged seemed at a loss what to do; I read the election law to him bearing upon that point; then he said I was right, and there was another row and noise, shouting and yelling at him from the outside of the window. At this point, the judge said, "one vote one way or the other won't make any difference in this election" and deposited Swartz's ticket (SR 1402: Contested Congressional Election in the Third District of Pennsylvania: MD 3, 72-76, 185-86; Leonard Myers vs. John Moffett, Oct. 13, 1868) .
19. The number and names of election officials, of course, varied from state to state. Pennsylvania may have had the greatest number: a judge of election (from the party holding a majority in the precinct), two inspectors, two inspector clerks, two return inspectors, and two return clerks. The latter were equally divided between the two major parties. SR 1199: MD 17, [66] [67] . This boundary between chaos and order was graphically displayed in some elections. For example, in Baltimore's thirteenth ward in 1859, a member of the Know-Nothing party literally "sat in the window, with his feet across it, his back against one side of the window and his feet against the other" as a way of demonstrating his party's complete control of the polls (SR 1060 : MD 4, 80-81, Nov. 2, 1859 . For another instance of a partisan sitting in the window, this one a challenger at a St. Louis precinct, see SR 1062: Contested Congressional Election in the First District of Missouri: MD 8, 729; Frank P. Blair, Jr. vs. J.R. Barrett, Aug., 1858.
21. Once their tickets had been printed, most party organizations depended upon individuals to prepare and take them to the polls. For example, a Democrat in East Liberty, Pennsylvania, had "for a number of years . . . been in the habit of getting a part or all of the tickets for the democratic party. I have generally made it a rule to gather up a little party of girls the evening before to help fold the tickets. On the 18th October, I believe, I received all the tickets of Dunbar Township; at least, all I knew of. I had the tickets cut, folded, and put in a cigar box and a paper box. Going to the election, I gave one box to Alexander Hill, and we each rode a horse, turnabout; and he carried one and I carried the other." ( 22. The San Francisco Daily Alta California in 1855 described the duty of these party agents as "to yell at the pitch of his lungs the ticket he espoused and the utter folly of the opponent's 'paper.'" In an 1860 election, "every other man" attending the polling place was said to be "holding in his hands big bundles of tickets" (Philip J. Ethington, The Public City: The Political Construction of Urban Life in San Francisco, 1850 -1900 [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994 , 74). the crowd that gathered outside the voting window and gave out tickets to voters upon request. 23 In some cases, where the voting seemed peaceful and the election judges were cooperative, the tickets were left in piles on the window ledge; the voter could then select the appropriate ticket at the same time they presented themselves to the officials.
24

MAJOR CONSEQUENCES OF THE TICKET SYSTEM
The ticket system had a number of profound consequences on nineteenth-century American politics. First, although a ticket could be drawn up on a plain piece of paper by the voter himself, almost all tickets were manufactured by the parties. They alone determined who would appear on their tickets through procedures that were entirely outside the purview of the law. In effect, political parties were sovereign private clubs wholly beyond governmental control. Second, although the ticket system strengthened the hand of major party organizations, it also enabled political insurgents. When the major party organizations met in nineteenth-century conventions, the delegates struggled over issues such as slavery in which compromise was difficult and sometimes impossible. When a party failed to find common ground upon which all their members could stand, these conventions often broke up as the losers bolted. The bolting faction would then either fuse with the opposition or field its own independent ticket. If the bolters fused, they would combine forces with the opposition, constructing a single ticket with candidates drawn from both the bolters and the opposition party. If they fielded their own ticket, the bolters would simply draw up a list of candidates and print tickets to distribute at the polls. Unlike contemporary politics where a new party would have to circulate petitions, pay filing fees, and meet deadlines months before an election takes place, a party faction could become an effective contender at the polls even if it bolted only hours before the voting started.
Thus the ticket system, on the one hand, allowed the major parties, as private clubs, to be an undemocratic in their internal procedures as they wished and, on the other, punished the major parties if they were unresponsive to their members by making it easy to bolt the party's ticket. In some respects, these features made nineteenth-century American politics far more issue-oriented and responsive to popular sentiment than our contemporary system, with its governmentregulated primaries and strong restrictions on candidacy in general elections.
25
A third important consequence of the ticket system on nineteenth-century politics was the way in which it shaped the polling place. Tickets, for example, were only recognized by the government once they had crossed through the voting window into the hands of an election judge. Until then, they were mere scraps of paper -there are accounts in which children have been described as playing with uncast tickets on election day. 26 There are other accounts in which these strips of paper were violently torn out of the hands of prospective voters and ripped to shreds. Either way, in the eyes of election officials, the ticket was a meaningless scrap until it reached their hands. This discrimination clearly demarcated the boundary between the formal process within the room holding the election officials and the anarchic conditions in the street or public square outside the voting window.
The final consequence of the ticket system was the stress it placed on political parties as formal organizations. As already noted, it was the party's responsibility to see that tickets were available at every polling place. This required that the tickets be printed in advance. Since the tickets usually listed all the offices more times stop about the porch a bit, but never bother any more about it . . . I cannot say exactly whether I read the ticket or not; mostly I get the ticket from a man, knowing his politics, and knowing that he feels as I feel myself. Sometimes I do not look much at the ticket. (SR 1199: MD 17, 71) . In this instance, the voter's reliance on the distributor was reinforced by the fact that he could have read the names on the ticket only with great difficulty, if at all.
24. For example, a witness testified that he could identify which ticket another man voted because the latter had picked up his ticket "out of the window. They were lying [in] the window, each pile separate." This was in the eastern precinct of the eighth ward in St. Louis which appears to have been relatively peaceful (SR 1062: MD 8, 739) . In one of the precincts in New York City during the 1864 election, each party placed a box of tickets on the street outside the polling place. Voters would select the ticket they wished to vote before proceeding to the polls (SR 1269: MD 7, pt. 1, 21, 27) .
25. This is largely because the party professionals attending conventions were much more aware and responsive to policy issues than the public at large. This fact, in addition to their direct experience with the conduct of elections under the ticket system, made insurgency both easy and policy-oriented. As a result, the policy stances of the major parties were pulled away from one another by the need to accommodate their respective, policy-oriented activists.
26. For example, the Rev. L.D. Maier, pastor of the German Lutheran Church in Baltimore, and a friend went to the polls but could not find tickets that they wanted to vote. Walking down the street a bit, they saw a little girl sitting on the steps of a house on Baltimore street, playing with a ticket; we asked the little girl to show us the tickets, it was the ticket suited us; Mr. contested in an election, the office with the smallest geographical constituency dictated the printing. For example, if the only office contested was the presidency or governorship, the parties would have needed to print only one kind of ticket for the entire state; if members of Congress were also up for election, then there would have to be separate tickets printed for each of the congressional districts; if seats in the state legislature were contested as well, they would require the printing of different tickets in each of the legislative districts; and so forth. In many instances, the parties were printing hundreds of different tickets throughout the state, each one appropriate for a small number of polling places. Such a system required an extensive administrative organization within the party in order to arrange the proper manufacturing of these tickets. It also necessitated close cooperation with printers, usually the editors of city and county newspapers that had become publicly aligned with that party. The ticket system also required the stationing of party workers for the distribution of tickets at the polls on election day. 27 Although some of these workers were little more than hired hands, most had a substantial reason to favor their party. Many, for example, enjoyed the patronage of elected party officials by holding government jobs, drawing public pensions, servicing government contracts, or enjoying special licensing privileges of one sort or another. Others were committed to their party for ideological reasons. But, whatever their motivation, they were stationed at the polls where they directly participated in the voting. One of the most common forms of participation was aiding illiterate or semiliterate voters select their tickets. For example, one illiterate Ohio voter reported this as his normal practice at the polls, "When I get a ticket from a good democrat I takes 'em." 28 In all these ways, the ticket system shaped the physical setting of the nineteenth-century polling place, providing the context within which the remainder of election laws were interpreted and enforced.
ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL REQUIREMENTS FOR VOTING
In contemporary elections, voting eligibility is restricted by age, residency, and citizenship. In the mid-nineteenth century, eligibility was similarly restricted, but the list was somewhat longer; in addition to age, residency, and citizenship, voting was sometimes or often restricted by race, ethnicity, gender, and mental competency. During the Civil War and Reconstruction, loyalty to the Union government was a requirement for voting in the border states and the South. While these restrictions are interesting in their own right, the focus here will be on how they were enforced. The most important aspects of enforcement are: (1) the evidence required to demonstrate voting eligibility and (2) the officials who must evaluate that evidence. With respect to evidence, it should be first remembered that much of the United States during the nineteenth century was a preliterate society; until the turn of the century, in fact, there were many counties in which a quarter or more of adult white men could not read or write. 29 This meant that voters were unable to THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX 9 27. While the vast majority of tickets voted in most elections were distributed at the polls, there were exceptions. The most common alternative was the printing of tickets in newspapers aligned with one of the parties; men could simply clip out the ticket and turn it in at the voting window. Less frequently, the party organizations distributed tickets directly to voters at their homes before the election was held. In New York City, for example, G.Z. House reported that a letter was left at my house [a few days before the election] with a ticket inclosed; and I read the circular, and I examined the tickets the morning I put them in. The whole of the tickets were done up in a little bunch, with a piece of india-rubber round it; and I took them all apart and examined them separate. . . . I remember seeing the name of Horace Greely for elector. I recollected his name. I thought he was sound on the goose. After stating that he "went the whole hog, Abe and all," House affirmed that the bundle of tickets he had cast "contained the hog and the goose both" (SR 1269: MD 7, pt. 1, 156) . In some instances, men would make out their own tickets where none were available at the polls. A particularly striking case occurred in rural Missouri during the 1860 presidential election, when a man insisted on voting the Republican ticket in the face of almost universal opprobrium and public threats of violence (n.a. MD 11, [9] [10] 21, [27] [28] [29] 32, [35] [36] 39, 41, 43, 59, 61, 63 ; Henry D. Washburn vs. Daniel W. Voorhees, Oct. 1864. These were all Republican voters at the Hamilton township precinct in Sullivan county or at the Cloverdale polls in Putnam county. There were 166 depositions given by Republican voters at the Hamilton township polls; twenty-five of those men signed with their mark, indicating they could not write their name. As evidence of the level of illiteracy in this township, this should be considered a lower bound; the actual level was probably much higher (ibid., 8-45) . Of the seventy-six depositions from Cloverdale township, ten were signed with a mark (ibid., 53-69).
29. According to the U.S. Census, illiteracy among white males twenty years of age and older was already quite low by 1850. Oregon, for example, reported only 1.8 percent of adult white males as illiterate, the lowest rate in the nation. New Hampshire (1.9 percent), Connecticut (2.0), Maine (2.2), Utah (3.0), and Rhode Island (3.4) also reported low rates. At the high end of the distribution were New Mexico (83.1), North Carolina (21.8), Arkansas (18.8), Tennessee (17.9), Minnesota (16.5), and Kentucky (15.9). All rates calculated by the author from The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850 (Washington, DC: Robert Armstrong, 1853). However, these figures should probably be considered lower bounds; actual rates were most likely substantially higher. For example, the instructions given to census takers read:
Under heading 12, entitled "Persons over 20 years of age who cannot read and write." The marshall should be careful to note all persons in each family, over 20 years of age, who cannot read and write, and opposite the name of each make a mark, thus, (I.) The spaces opposite the names of those who can read and write are to be left blank. If the person can read and write a foreign language, he is to be considered as able to read and write. (ibid., xxii) keep records of when they were born or how long they had resided in a town or neighborhood. Since government agencies seldom kept records of these things, there were no certificates that could be presented to election officials as demonstrations of a voter's eligibility. This was less true of citizenship, where the federal government provided naturalization papers when immigrants became American citizens.
30
However, since native-born citizens were not given such certificates, election officials had to know when and whom to ask for papers. A major complicating factor was that, in most instances, there was no voter registration prior to an election. 31 For this reason, the determination of voter eligibility took place at the polls and was carried out by the "judges of election." (This was probably the most important reason why they were called "judges.") In order to understand just how voter eligibility was determined, it is useful to recall how the polling place was arranged. Voters gathered outside the voting window, waiting for their turn to hand in a ticket to the judges. When they made it to the front of the line (sometimes there were lines, sometimes there were just crowds of people), voters would step onto the platform and face the voting window. When a voter presented himself, he was always asked his name. Most judges were chosen as representatives of the major parties; sometimes there were two, sometimes three, but they were almost always drawn from opposing parties. The judges were thus in a position to monitor both the qualifications of individual voters and each other's official behavior. In addition to the judges, who were stationed inside the polling place, the parties also stationed volunteers called "challengers" who would stand outside on either side of the voting window.
32 These challengers could, as the
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Given this procedure, there are several reasons why the census probably underestimated illiteracy. First, respondents were asked to report their ability to read and write in the absence of any demonstration that they could actually do so. Any social stigma attached to illiteracy would encourage respondents to exaggerate their abilities. Second, the default indication, if the census taker failed to ask the literacy question, was that a person was literate; marks were made only when the question was asked and the respondent stated that he was illiterate. If the question was not asked, the space would have been left blank and would have been indistinguishable from returns in which the question had been asked and the respondent was literate. Thus, incomplete returns would have been biased toward higher literacy. Finally, literacy in a foreign language, while probably of some help to a man attempting to navigate the mid-nineteenth-century polling place, would still have been a substantial handicap if the voter did not also know English. In any case, circumstantial evidence from the contested election hearings strongly suggests that illiteracy rates, in terms of a functional ability to distinguish party and candidate names on tickets, were much higher than the census reported. For evidence that the census was poorly conducted in general, see SR 631: Report of the Select Committee on Revision of the Plan for Publication of the Census Returns, June 28, 1852: Committee Report ࠻ 276: 1-10. Although this Senate committee did not specifically comment on the illiteracy schedule, their report suggested that many other schedules, comprising approximately four-fifths of the returns were so flawed that they were not worth publishing. Margo Anderson was a little more charitable; she concluded that "the contemporary charges of total incompetence and corruption in the processing of the 1850 census were" merely "unlikely" (The American Census: A Social History [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1988], 51). 30. These documents were not by any means infalliable proof of citizenship. For example, in Philadelphia during the Civil War, when alien status conferred an automatic exemption from military service, one immigrant was reported to have said that he was not afraid of being drafted because "I ain't naturalized." However, he still voted " [u] pon my nephew's papers; he is of the same name" (SR 1199: MD 17, 175). There are many instances in other elections where naturalization papers appear to have been passed around at different precincts, thus allowing many different men to vote upon one set of documents.
31. For a history of registration laws in the various states between 1865 and 1910, including accounts of the kinds of election frauds which they were intended to eliminate, see Joseph P. Harris, Registration of Voters in the United States (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1929), 65-89, 232-39. Registration laws appeared first in large cities where the increasing anonymity of American society made personal knowledge of voter identity by challengers impossible. However, most early registration procedures were easily and fraudulently modified by party machines in such a way as to retain, for example, the names of dead mean on the voting rolls. While Harris emphasized fraud as the reason these early registration laws failed, the social and technical infrastructure necessary for effective implementation was also very weak and, in some cases, entirely lacking. For example, handwritten lists of eligible voters were often difficult to read, making precise identification of many immigrant names impossible. In addition, many voters were unable to spell their names so that, when they appeared at the polls, election judges and clerks were compelled to rely on phonetic matches between what the voter uttered and the names appearing on the registration rolls. Finally, many cities did not have systematic criteria for identifying individual houses so that placing voters within their correct precincts and wards was extremely difficult. In many cases, men who misrepresented their identities at the polls simply could not be found after the election was held. Further frustrating this task was the fact that many adult men lived in boarding houses, frequently moving from one to the other within the same neighborhood. The invention and rapid adoption of the typewriter largely solved the first problem and also made alphabetizing registration lists much easier as well (so that clerks did not have to scan all the names in order to find the voter at the voting window). As literacy rates rose, voters were better able to identify themselves and, incidentally, the imposition of literacy tests became politically feasible in many states. Finally, as urban governments developed the means of identifying individual buildings and neighborhood boundaries, the feasibility of imposing residency requirements on city voters increased. However, even with these developments, ascertaining the identity and eligibility of the urban voter, even in the absence of fraud, remained a serious problem well into the twentieth century.
32. When asked if there had been "any republican challengers at the polls" in Newton township in Licking county, Ohio, one of the judges of election replied, "Yes, sir; as thick as crows all day" (SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 100). For many challengers, an election was a long and arduous ordeal. Joseph Allen, a challenger in Philadelphia, for example, reported that he arrived at the polling place just before seven in the morning, just before the polls opened. He stayed at his post for the next eleven hours, until they closed. As Allen put it, It required all my time to watch the movement of the enemy. . . . I took dinner at the window. I always do. 33 For example, many of the challenges asserted that the voter was of foreign birth and had not been naturalized. When a prospective voter was challenged, he had to demonstrate, to the satisfaction of the election judges, that he indeed met the criteria named in the challenge. In this case, the voter was asked either to demonstrate that he had been born in the United States or, if he conceded his foreign birth, to present his naturalization papers. Election judges could also challenge voters on their own initiative but usually preferred to leave this role to the challengers.
Challengers, like everyone else outside the voting window, carried out an entirely private role; election law only said that any citizen could challenge the qualifications of any prospective voter. 34 Anyone, regardless of whether or not they belonged to a party organization could play this role; while the parties selected men to act as monitors at the polls, these challengers still acted in a purely private capacity.
35
Challengers, like the election judges, were usually chosen from the ranks of party professionals who had resided in the community for years. They knew many of the voters on sight, including their party allegiance, residency status, and age.
36 Unfamiliar faces were sometimes greeted with suspicion by the challengers and judges of both parties until the voter indicated how he was going to vote; at that point, the opposing party would formally challenge his qualifications. This, however, gets a little ahead of the analysis. First two features must be discussed: (1) what evidence of his qualifications the prospective voter could be expected to bring to the polls and (2) how the election judges evaluated that evidence. At a bare minimum, the voter presented his person to the judges. The judges could, for example, estimate a voter's age by examining his ability to raise a beard. Ethnicity could be guessed at by observing his attire and his accent when he spoke.
37 Clothing and speech were rough guides to both the likely party leanings of the prospective voter and the probability that he was of foreign birth.
Gender was rarely an issue at the polls; however, there were a few instances where challengers asserted that women voted. These occurred when horse-drawn carriages rolled in to the polling place and a servant made his way to the voting window with a ticket or two. Stating that their masters were too ill to walk to the voting window, the servant would ask that the tickets be received without requiring these voters to get out of their carriage. Because the carriage curtains remained drawn, the challengers noted that anyone could be inside; in these instances, challenges were sometimes made on the basis of gender because that was the most insulting accusation could be made. 34. When a reform party challenger in Baltimore's thirteenth ward appealed to the judges inside the room whether we [the reform party] were not entitled to one side of the window, and whether they would not give us one side", the "judges said they had nothing to do outside of the window. (SR 1060: MD 4, 80-81. 35. In some respects, this arrangement was parallel to the American court system, with challengers acting as attorneys for their respective parties (one prosecuting and the other defending the voter) and the judges (although seldom objectively) evaluating the merits of the voter's credentials. In this adversarial system, altruism was rare and was received sceptically. For example, when Samuel Null, a Pennsylvania man, reported that he had taken "steps to find out illegal votes on both sides," with some of his investigations involving visits to family homes and farms, he was asked, "What induced you to start out on this Quixotic crusade?" Null replied that he "thought it a duty to my country." And so it was but almost no one but Samuel Null performed this duty in the middle of the nineteenth century (SR 1431: MD (no number, bound between 24 and 25), 171, 178).
36. As a reform party challenger in Baltimore's thirteenth ward testified, "I knew almost every one in the ward who was entitled to vote. I challenged them, and they were put down when I challenged them, for the judges would not take their votes" (SR 1060: MD 4, 81). 37. Asked if any "foreigners" had voted in his community, a man in Kentucky, a naturalized foreign-born citizen himself, answered that he knew "one John Conner, who voted for W.C. Anderson. . . . I judge him to be a foreigner from his language and appearance" (SR 1061: Contested Congressional Election in the Fourth District of Kentucky: MD 3, 24; James S. Chrisman vs. William C. Anderson, Aug. 1, 1859). A Republican clerk in Philadelphia similarly testified that it "is easy enough to tell a native American from a foreigner" because the latter "generally speak a different language from what native Americans do." In addition, they "spoke broken English" (SR 1431: MD 7, 35) . Also see SR 1431: MD (no number, bound between 24 and 25), 236.
38. Such carriages appeared often enough to affect the arrangement of the polls. In Baltimore's eighteenth ward in 1859, for example, a scaffold between eight and ten feet high had been constructed in front of the voting window in order to facilitate the orderly movement of voters. However, as one election judge reported, this "barricade was such that we could not see out into the street in front of us. . . . I had one board of the barricade taken off, so that when hacks were brought up with sick men we could see them" (SR 1060: MD 4, 160). In one Pennsylvania precinct, most of the five men who remained in their carriages apparently did not want to wade through the crowd around the voting window. Their tickets were passed through the crowd to the judges. One of these men was ill (SR 1431: MD (no number, bound between 24 and 25), 45-46. For another instance, this one involving an "old man" who remained in his carriage while his ticket was passed up to the judges, see SR 1432: Contested Congressional Election in the Fourth District of Indiana: MD 15, 344; Jonathan S. Reid vs. George W. Julian, Oct. 13, 1868. the polling places were located in buildings where women, at least respectable women, were seldom found. Saloons and livery stables, for example, were usually off limits to women in this strongly Victorian age. For another, the polls on election day were frequently places in which liquor was both freely available and consumed to excess. The parties often provided, either as courtesy or bribe, free drinks to prospective voters, challengers, and election officials.
39
As a result, the street or square outside the voting window frequently became a kind of alcoholic festival in which many men were clearly and spectacularly drunk. 40 In some instances, drunken men in effect besieged the polling place, more or less turning the judges of election and their clerks into temporary prisoners. One of the election clerks at an Ohio polling place during the 1866 congressional election described an all too common scene. The ballot boxes along with the judges and clerks were housed inside "a kind of storeroom, granary, or something like that." The door to the outside was locked because "the catch was out of order and we were obliged to lock it in order to keep the door shut." And it was important to keep the door shut because "there were some drunken men about, noisy, and we did not wish them in. . . . One [of these men] was a republican and the other a democrat." However, sober, well-behaved voters were admitted into the room in order to watch the proceedings if these "noisy men were [not] around . . . then we did not open the door, for they wanted to be in and out all the time." As one of the election judges later reported, "those noisy men [were] in liquor. . . . They were noisy in the morning, and were noisy all day, and also in the evening."
41
For this and other reasons, the language at the polls was much more coarse than the typical, highly stylized conversations that would transpire in mixed company. In fact, the crowds gathered around the polls often insulted voters who appeared to be supporting the opposing party. These insults easily moved into various forms of physical intimidation as members of the crowd, either individually or in groups, blocked the passage of prospective voters to the voting window, implicitly threatening violence if the voter pressed his way forward.
42
Violence and intimidation were usually restricted to the immediate vicinity of the polling place; otherwise, potential voters were free to go about their business. It was only when men approached the polls that 12 RICHARD BENSEL 39. Alcohol was apparently provided to voters by candidates long before organized parties dominated the polls. For example, in the 1806-1807 session of the Massachusetts House of Representatives, the seat from the town of Sandford was contested because the sitting member, Thomas Keeler, had provided voters with "refreshment of victuals and drink." The town meeting was "tumultuous and disorderly, and conducted with an unusual and unpardonable degree of spirit and acrimony, probably from the cause above mentioned." After his election, Keeler issued a "public invitation to all the electors, to go to any or all of the public houses or stores . . . or to his own house . . . to receive such refreshments as they should want, at his expense." As a result, "on the evening of the election, there was every appearance of riot and drunkenness, at Keeler's store, among the electors, and fighting and quarrelling [sic] were prevalent among them" (Luther S. Cushing, Reports of Contested Elections in the Massachusetts House of Representatives, 1780 -1834 [Boston: Dutton and Wentworth, 1834 , 45-46). The leading authority on the legality of election practices, George W. McCrary, complained, "The too common practice of providing liquors to be used to influence voters in a convention, primary election, or regular legal election, is a practice which the law will not tolerate." However, the only punishment he could find was to render void any contract in which the intent was to procure and distribute liquor to voters (A Treatise on the American Law of Elections ([Keokuk, Iowa: R.B. Ogden, 1875], 139). Since these arrangements could usually not bear scrutiny on many other grounds, rendering such contracts unenforceable in a court of law was equivalent to no punishment at all. 40. A close connection between alcohol consumption and unruly conduct by crowds attending the polls was commonly understood. For example, when Louis Valle, a voter at St. George's market in St. Louis in 1858 was asked if that polling place had been "peaceable and quiet," he replied, "Yes, sir; no whiskey to be had" (SR 1062: MD 8, 745) . In New Jersey, by the 1860s, "[s]cenes of drunkenness at the polls had become traditional. Indeed, in a great many places voting still took place in a 'hotel,' which made resort to spirituous refreshment both convenient and tempting" (McCormick, History of Voting in New Jersey, 151-52). One Democrat claimed to have left his party because the "party's power of absorption was so great that I could not fill them with whiskey" (SR 1402: Contested Congressional Election in the Eleventh District of New York: MD 27, pt. 1, 100; Charles H. Van Wyck vs. George W. Greene, Nov. 3, 1868).
41. SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 464, 466. Many men were apparently so drunk when they cast their votes that afterward they could not remember anything about their participation in the election. See, for example, SR 1431: MD 7, 355-56. In this same congressional election but in a different district, a man named Michael Kelly went to the polls, was challenged on the grounds that he was an alien, and responded by presenting a bottle of whiskey to the election judges, loudly proclaiming that the bottle "was his papers." Kelly himself later testified that on the day of the election he "was in Uniontown, pretty well drunk; so drunk I didn't know when I got out of the [street]cars." When asked if he had gone to the polls in Dunbar Township, which would have entailed traveling some distance from Uniontown, Kelly replied, That's a pretty hard question to answer. I have been many a time into a man's house, and didn't know it three days after. 42. In describing the "distinctly physical dimension to voting" in San Francisco elections, Philip Ethington states that to reach the ballot box, a voter had to wade through a scene of tumult and noise [in which a] level of physical contact, and even violence, was inherent in the normal conduct of voting. . . . Casting a ballot meant far more than depositing a slip of paper; it entailed a physical presence and required a personal resilience to being jostled, shouted at, and challenged. (The Public City, (74) (75) (76) (77) partisans began to construct them as allies or enemies. The social setting around the precinct then became a highly charged ethnic, religious, and ideological battleground in which individuals were stereotyped as friend or foe on the basis of their clothing, accent, or skin color. Under the informal conventions of the period, election etiquette required only that a "man of ordinary courage" be able to make his way to the voting window. This was the general standard by which normal jostling was distinguished from excessive violence. 43 Those men too timid to meet this condition could not rightfully claim, under the social practices and understandings of the time, that their right to vote had been denied. 44 However, if conditions became too threatening, thus dissuading a "man of ordinary courage" from pressing his way through a hostile crowd, then most observers would agree that the election results were invalid at that precinct.
45
As might be presumed, this standard was difficult to apply in practice. In any event, no woman was expected, in this Victorian age, to be as physically brave as an ordinary man. Furthermore, even a veiled physical threat to a woman by a man would have been cause for public scandal. In fact, one of the strongest arguments against women's suffrage in the nineteenth century was that the polls were "no place for a woman." The response, though less persuasive to most Americans in the period, was that the presence of women would have compelled men, in effect, to clean up their act -resulting in at least a much higher standard of public decorum at the polls and, possibly, more honest elections. 46 Both arguments, of course, could be true at the same time. In actual fact, however, elections were one of the most purely male venues in American society; women were almost never seen within the immediate neighborhood of a polling place on election day. 47 But we should return to our main topic. One of the primary responsibilities of a judge of election, in addition to receiving tickets and depositing them in the ballot box, was the evaluation of voter eligibility. In carrying out this responsibility, however, judges had very little to work with in terms of hard evidence. Birth certificates, for example, would have made the determination of age a relatively easy matter. But most states did not officially record births, and such certificates were simply unavailable at most polling places. In practice, election judges usually relied on a close physical inspection of the prospective voter, called up a collective recollection of the voter's personal history, or simply accepted the voter's word that he had reached the required age for voting.
In all these matters, the prospective voter could be asked to swear that he met the qualifications for voting; he could, for example, be asked to take an oath that he was in fact a natural born citizen or had reached twenty-one years of age.
48 "Taking out the THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX 13 43 . See, for example, this question posed to a doctor who had gone to the polls in Baltimore's nineteenth ward, "Will you please state any remarks made by any of the crowd calculated to intimidate a man of ordinary courage, and to prevent his exercising the right of suffrage as a freeman?" (SR 1060: MD 4, 177). This was the general standard by which "normal" jostling was distinguished from excessive "violence. 44. When asked to give his age, weight, and height, a man who had been prevented from reaching the voting window in Baltimore's eighteenth ward answered, "I am a little over fifty; weight, from 212 to 215 pounds; and am about six feet high." Then asked, "Are you not a man in the full vigor of manhood and strength?", he replied, "I should think I was, sir." This exchange occurred after the witness had said that he did not attempt to vote "because I was satisfied that it would be useless." Another voter in the nineteenth ward was similarly asked for his height, age, and weight, answering "I am six feet high, and 44, or 45, or 46 years old; somewhere along there . . . [my weight is] 270." He was then asked for the state of his health, responding "Very good." However, when requested to "describe what persistent efforts you made to get up to the window to vote," he stated that he "did not make any at all" (SR 1060: MD 4, 153, 154, 247) . A lawyer working for the reform coalition in the tenth ward testified that he asked "considerable numbers of native-born citizens" who had reform tickets "to vote, persuaded them to vote, endeavored to influence their manhood, but, looking about, they would say they had wives and children, and would not like to risk their lives in a useless attempt" (ibid., 203).
45. On occasion, men were actually killed. For example, a voter was murdered at the polls in Baltimore's fifteenth ward in 1859. For an emotional and graphic account of his death, given in testimony by his brother, who was wounded in the same incident, see SR 1060: MD 4, 139, 140. 46. As it was, expectations with reference to acceptable public behavior were usually low. For example, John Hanson Thomas, president of the Farmers' and Merchants' Bank and judge of election in Baltimore's eleventh ward, described the municipal elections in October, 1859, decidedly the most fair, free, and honest election ever held in our ward. I do not believe there was a soul there who did not have perfectly free access to the polls, and who did not give his vote; there was some little scrambling, &c., but the police did their duty in an admirable manner. The other judges acted with me; we were determined to preserve order and to give an opportunity to vote to all who desired to vote; the consequence was that after some fighting, and after arresting a man and committing him to jail for striking two men, the whole thing was done, and it was the most quiet and orderly election I ever saw in the ward. (SR 1060: MD 4, 99, 101) 47. In the thousands upon thousands of pages contained in the contested election hearings, there was only one instance in which a woman was reported to have been in or around the polling place. This occurred in the 1866 congressional election in Mount Vernon, Ohio, when the wife of a man who had apparently suffered a disabling stroke escorted her spouse to the polls with the help of his male friends (SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 198) .
48. For example, the judge of election in Florence, Nebraska, testified that, "There were challenges; some on account of age; book," as the process of swearing was called when the Bible was presented to the voter, resolved many disputes over voting qualifications by simply placing the burden on the voter. 49 If the voter lied under an oath given to an election judge, he could be fined or imprisoned. Oath-taking was probably most commonly used in the border states during the Civil War and the early years of Reconstruction; election judges in the border states were enjoined to prevent men who had "sympathized" with the Confederacy from voting. Since sympathy often involved purely private thoughts that had never been on public display, requiring prospective voters to swear that they had indeed never harbored southern sympathies at least made a pretense at enforcement. Given the number of men who actually refused to swear such an oath, that pretense clearly had some impact.
Generally speaking, oaths had one major defect: they were only as good as the underlying threat of discovery. If, for example, it could be demonstrated under more intensive investigation that a prospective voter had not reached the qualifying age under election laws, then the voter who swore a false oath ran at least some risk of prosecution. However, many men who presented themselves at the polls simply did not know the answer to the questions posed to them by election judges. They did not know, for example, when they were born and thus when or if they had reached the required voting age. This was true for perhaps 10 percent or so of the population, but it varied widely by region. In some parts of rural Kentucky, for instance, it seemed as if almost no one knew how old they were during the years just before the Civil War. But many, if not most, oaths were sworn by voters who were unknown to the election judges; many of these men, once the election had taken place, could not be located. They simply merged back into what was often a chaotic social cauldron in which anonymity cloaked, to the point of invisibility, those who lived a transient existence. For these men, false oaths were only part of a social negotiation in which they traded their vote for a favor, money, or a shot of whiskey.
In all these instances, election judges were forced to rely on evidence that was immediately available to them at the polls. That evidence could usually be classified under three different headings. The first was the testimony of the prospective voter himself, often backed by a sworn oath that the information he provided was true. The second was the close inspection of the prospective voter's physical appearance, attire, speech, and demeanor. The third was the joint recollection of the election judges, challengers, and bystanders as to the social characteristics, such as racial identity and age, of the prospective voter.
Election practice emerged out of the interaction between, on the one hand, familiarity, if any, between party agents and voters and, on the other, the formal requirements for voting set down in election law. With respect to the latter, the Virginia Constitution stipulated that:
In thus defining suffrage eligibility, Virginia made at least ten different kinds of distinctions between various individuals inhabiting the state. The adjective "white," for example, distinguished "white" people from all other races. The noun "citizen" drew a line between citizens and aliens. The disqualifying attributes of "unsound mind" and "pauper" categorized individuals with reference to mental competency and economic self-sufficiency. In different ways, the residency and age requirements made time, with reference to personal history, a defining element. Personal history, in terms of criminal behavior, also entered into convictions for bribery or "infamous" offences. MD 68, 195 ) Also see, p. 233. At one Philadelphia polling place, the custom was to "kiss the book," something Joseph Weisser refused to do because he said he "wouldn't kiss what everybody put to their lips." His vote was rejected for that reason. (Weisser himself said that he had kissed the Bible but that the election judge didn't think he had kissed it "right.") Weisser went away then but returned some time later and asked the judge "to hand him out the book and he would kiss it, 15, 20 or 25 times." At this point, however, Weisser had been drinking heavily and, although there seems to have been some disagreement about whether or not he was drunk, he was not allowed to vote (SR 1402: MD 3, 174-75, 389-91, 421-22 Each one of these distinctions, in turn, compelled party agents and election officials to identify, in some way or another, the category into which a prospective voter fell. Among the most important of these distinctions were those concerning residency, citizenship, and mental competency.
RESIDENCY
Americans were on the move in the nineteenth century. Much of that movement took the form of longdistance migration to the western frontier. In terms of residency requirements for voting, this migration raised some problems even though arrival in a western community could usually be more or less precisely dated and thus compared to the statutory qualification. Before arrival, men were in transit and thus unambiguously outside the community in which they desired to vote. Many difficulties in determining a man's residency arose because sparsely and newly settled frontier communities often had indistinct boundaries, and neighbors often could not vouch for those who lived next to them. In fact, they sometimes did not know if anyone lived sufficiently close to them to be considered a "neighbor." But the problems in determining residency within densely settled, older communities were often even greater. In the latter, many men, particularly young men, were constantly on the move as they searched for temporary employment as farm hands, lumberjacks, or other kinds of seasonal labor. All states had residency requirements for voting, specifying a certain number of weeks or months in a county as a suffrage qualification. Most of the time, these requirements were unproblematic; voters had lived most of all of their lives in a locality and the election judges, being long-time residents of the community themselves, knew it.
52
In fact, many adult men were transients who, in effect, orbited around a central place or lodging that they might call their residence or, less formally, their home. Although they might return to this residence very infrequently, judges of election normally expected that every man would have one, and thus, the problem was to identify which of a number of possibilities might be a man's residence when he was challenged at the polls. 53 As the testimony described below indicates, election judges considered many different things to be evidence of residence, including where a man's wife lived (if married), where his parents resided (if unmarried), where a man worked (if employed), and how he represented himself (calling, for example, one place or another "home").
54
The more-or-less accepted rule held that men in transit could keep a residence in one community, for the purposes of voting, if they "intended" to return to that community once their employment was finished. 55 They also had to keep some sort of physical presence in that community. This placed a lot of stress on the laborer's intention, and election judges were often skeptical of the personal plans retrospectively described by men presenting themselves at the polls. One common example, generally typical of period, involved the western migration of the population to the frontier. Adult men would often explore opportunities in the West before returning to move their families to states like Iowa or Minnesota. If they decided not to migrate, they returned home and again took up residence. But did they, during the weeks or months they spent in their search for opportunities in other states, always "intend" to return permanently
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many free (as well as other slave) states. See, for example, Keyssar, Right to Vote, 33, [61] [62] [63] A.9. 52. In some parts of the nation, election officials had to live in a locality for many years before they became familiar with the boundaries of the election district. In the South, the absence of townships made the identification of election districts difficult even for residents who had spent their entire lives in a region. remained in possession of their respective ferry, homesteads, and mill (Bull had probably already moved or died when this description was written), voters and election officials could rely on them to verify the location of watercourses (e.g., a branch or creek), locally prominent ridges, or otherwise unmarked and unmaintained wagon roads. Even so, new residents must have had difficulty explaining to election officials where they lived with reference to such a description; illiterate voters may have found the task next to impossible.
53. Determining residency appears to have been easier in states which imposed a poll tax. For example, antebellum New Jersey assessed a poll tax of fifty cents on all "the white male inhabitants aged 21 years and upwards." The tax records were considered conclusive evidence of both age and residency. SR 1103: Contested Congressional Election in the Third District of New York: MD 6, 39, 64; Amor J. Williamson vs. Daniel E. Sickles, Nov. 2, 1858.
54. In some cases, this could work the other way around, with the children providing the residence for the parent. Commenting on where his father-in-law, John Arndt, might call home, Fryman H. Hilleary of Licking county, Ohio, said, "Well, I should suppose it was with me; he had no permanent residence, only with his children; he had his washing, mending. . . . He is getting old and childish, and comes and goes as he pleases" (SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 56 to their homes? Most election judges ruled that they did, citing the residence of the wife as a substantial and continuing commitment to the community. Similarly, owning a substantial piece of property, such as a farm large enough to provide at least a modest income was deemed objective evidence of an intention to return.
56
Even in extreme cases, the location of a man's wife often trumped where he worked and lived. In 1866, for example, Samuel Sloane attempted to vote in Licking county, Ohio, where he had lived continuously since 1850. Several years prior to the election, however, he had moved his wife and youngest child to his son-in-law's home in Delaware county. His wife had subsequently become insane and had been "taken to the lunatic asylum in Columbus." Had she remained there, Sloane would probably have been eligible to vote in the county because that was where he worked, lived, and had his "washing" done. But, sometime in late June or early July of 1866 his wife had been released from the asylum and had returned to his son-in-law's home in Delaware county. During the summer, Sloane had provided for her support (although, apparently, not everything she needed) and had "intended to move his family into the township before the election, but it was so rainy that he could not get them in very easy -rainy and wet." So he had postponed the move.
57
When he presented himself at the polls in Hartford township, one of the judges of election, a Mr. Evans, held his ticket "up opened -kind of half open -and looked all around." One of the other judges, a Mr. Lemons, then asked, "Mr. Sloan, where do you claim your residence?" Then he asked me how long I had been in Hartford township. The first day of March, I told him, and ever since. I told him I had a witness there to prove it. They did not take any of them. I asked them to swear me; they refused to do it. I asked them the second time. I told them then, if I answered their questions, to put my ticket in the box; then, if I done wrong, to watch me, then punish me for it if I done wrong.
Evans, in fact, had employed Sloane less than three weeks before the election and was thus probably well aware that he met the residency requirement, aside from his wife. But both the judges were Republicans and Sloane, as revealed by his ticket, intended to support the Democrats. Citing his wife's residence as a reason, they ruled that he was ineligible to vote in Licking county.
58
One of the most interesting orbital employment patterns to appear in the historical record belonged to J.J. Sheppard, a voter in Wayne county, Kentucky, and a cousin of the Democratic candidate for Congress in 1859. When asked where he resided prior to the election, Sheppard replied:
I have resided in Wayne county, Kentucky, for the last two years and longer; something like two years ago I left my father, who then resided in the fifth or Sinking precinct, Wayne county, Kentucky, and came to the town of Monticello, Wayne county, Kentucky, where I voted, to live; I kept a grocery in Monticello, and was deputy surveyor for Wayne county; I kept a grocery until the month of May, 1858; I then stayed about Monticello, and was a candidate for county surveyor for Wayne county, until the Monday next before the August election, 1858, when I left the track and declined the race; I held the . . . office of deputy surveyor . . . until the new surveyor was elected and qualified, in August, 1858; I then knocked about, trading in first one thing and then another, but made the town of Monticello my home; on the second of November, 1858, or about that time, by an arrangement with Mr. E.G. Jones, he, Jones, furnished a lot of hogs and helped me drive them out to Whitley county, Kentucky, to the mart; and I agreed to help . . . Mr. Jones keep [the] . . . hogs together in the mart for one and a half cent per pound for the gain on the weight -the hogs to be weighed the first day of April last, 1859; . . . Mr. Jones is a citizen of Wayne county . . . residing in the town precinct No. 1, where I voted; we remained out there with the hogs until the first of April last, and then brought them back to . . . Mr. Jones'; my home was in Monticello, Kentucky, while I was out there with the hogs; a few days after returning with the hogs, as stated, I started from Monticello, Kentucky, to Georgia, to collect money that was due; I was 16 RICHARD BENSEL 56. With reference to these wanderings, "intent" was often cited as the primary criteria for establishing residency; would-be voters who had traveled west to look over the land but had returned home had to demonstrate, by their oath, that they had never had an "intent" to settle in those states. For an example of the latter, albeit involving a shorter distance, see the testimony of Timothy Blevins: "He [Blevins' son] said that if he bought the land he intended to move to it [a farm in Scott county, Tennessee]; but that if he did not buy it, he intended not to move." Also see the testimony, including letters written to his parents and siblings, of She is there on a temporary purpose with her daughter. That is a question you all know about, and I don't want it thrown in my teeth. She was taken sick, and became insane and went to the asylum, and was there seventeen months -at Columbus. gone to Georgia about fifteen days, and returned to my father's, in the Sinking precinct, No. 5; I then went out to Whitley county, where I had a farm, which farm I had rented out in the spring, 1859, and I having heard before I left my father's to go out there that the fellow to whom I had rented could not tend my farm, and then concluded to tend it myself, and did so; I raised corn and took care of a crop of wheat that was on it when I bought it; but I still claimed and regarded Monticello as my home, until about the last days of last August, when I determined to make Whitley county, Kentucky, my home. . . . I refused to list for taxation for the year 1859 in Whitley, although called on to do so out there; but listed and paid my taxes for said year, 1859, in Wayne county, Kentucky.
At least three possible residences appear in Sheppard's account: his family home in Sinking precinct; the town of Monticello where he held a minor public office and was, at times, a merchant; and Whitley county where he owned land. Of the three possibilities, he clearly chose the town of Monticello.
59 While his identification with the town would have been decisive in most cases, he was asked several additional questions. The first entailed what was the ubiquitous "washing" question: "Where was your washing done from August, 1858, until November, 1858?" His response, however, was not helpful: "It was done first once place and then another; I took my washing with me wherever I went." He was then asked if he had any belongings or property that he had kept in Monticello as he moved about the region. Once again his response was not particularly helpful: "I left nothing in the town precinct; I had a bed quilt that I left at my cousin's, B.W. Duncan, in Monticello." Although he was an office holder, part-time merchant, and clearly literate, Sheppard appeared to have very few possessions. When asked where he had left his "articles" as he traveled, he responded, Finally, Sheppard could not say whether or not he had spent more than two nights in Monticello between November, 1858 and August, 1859.
60 As in many other instances, even lengthy interrogation could not unambiguously ascertain Sheppard's residence. Shorter interviews by election judges at the polling place would have been even more uncertain.
CITIZENSHIP
Not all foreigners could vote in the mid-nineteenth century; only those who had been properly naturalized. Federal law stipulated that, in order for an immigrant to be eligible for United States citizenship, he must have resided in the United States for at least five consecutive years and at least one year in the state from which he applied. At least two years before he could be naturalized, an immigrant must have declared his intention to become a citizen, at the same time renouncing all allegiance to any foreign nation. As evidence of this declaration, he was issued what were universally known at the polls as his "first papers." Persons who entered the United States at an age younger than eighteen and some of those honorably discharged from the military or navy of the United States were not required to make these declarations. For the others, this oath marked the onset of a subsequent two-year waiting period before the immigrant could demonstrate, by way of good character and law-abiding history, that he qualified for American citizenship. He then renounced all titles and noble orders that may have been previously attached to his name while swearing to uphold the national constitution. Meeting these conditions, he was then given a document identifying him as a naturalized American citizen. These documents were issued by both the federal and, much more frequently, state courts that filled out and approved the necessary forms. At the polls, these were known universally as an immigrant's "second papers."
61
The states imposed varying requirements for vot-
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59. Monticello was little more than a hamlet in the 1850s. The only buildings of note reported in the period's leading gazetteer were a brick court house, two churches, and two tanneries (Lippincott's Pronouncing Gazetteer [Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott, 1856], 1232).
60. SR 1061: MD 3, 310, 312-13. The testimony does not indicate whether A.M. Shepperd was related to the witness, J.J. Sheppard. Nineteenth-century spelling of surnames was very relaxed, particularly in rural districts in which many people were illiterate.
61. These naturalization procedures were first set down in a federal law enacted on April 14, 1802, and remained almost unchanged for the remainder of the nineteenth century. ing with respect to citizenship. Many, such as Alabama and Arkansas, only required that immigrants had declared their intention to become citizens. 62 In practice, that meant that these men had to have taken out their "first papers," which, if challenged at the polls, they would present as evidence of their eligibility for voting. Others, such as West Virginia, required full American citizenship. If men in such states were challenged, they presented their "second papers." 63 These legal requirements made the identification of foreign-born residents at the polls one of the most important priorities of party agents and election officials.
Election judges were enjoined by law to ask foreignborn voters for documentary proof of naturalization or intent to become naturalized. 64 However, these officials had no easy way of identifying who was not a native-born citizen and, thus, who to ask for "papers." They often, by default, relied on the same ethnic stereotypes that partisans outside the voting window used to separate friendly and hostile voters. A heavy Irish brogue, for example, would almost always lead a Know-Nothing observer to challenge a voter, compelling the election judge to ask for "papers" and the voter to produce them. 65 In these cases, the participants did not usually have anything more to go on than their immediate observation of the voter. Most residents in large cities were, as now, anonymous outside their immediate neighborhoods or the close confines of their workplace or factory.
Thus, in communities with large numbers of aliens who were personally unknown to those attending the polls, the physical appearance of men who presented themselves was compared with stereotypes previously constructed for members of the various ethnic communities. As these men approached the voting window, they would be asked which party they were likely to support or where they lived. If a prospective voter belonged to an ethnic group that tended to support the opposition, he would be challenged as to his citizenship at the window and thus compelled to present his papers. If he belonged to a friendly group, party agents would turn the other way or, even more often, encourage his participation in the election regardless of whether or not he met statutory requirements for voting.
Most immigrants who attempted to vote carried their papers with them to the polls, if they were legally qualified, or tried to bluff their way through to the window, if they were not.
66 If challenged and the state allowed men with their first papers to vote, they might claim that they had been seventeen years of age or younger when they entered the county, thus explaining why they did not have papers. If such a claim was made, then election officials were compelled to construct the age of the voter and project that age back to the year when the man had immigrated to the United States. Since many of these men neither knew nor could document their current age or the year when they had immigrated, these estimates were often uncertain.
Martin Dermody, for example, knew that he had immigrated to the United States from Ireland but had only the vaguest recollection of when he had made the trip. At first he gave 1854 as the date of arrival, adding that he had come to America about "eleven years ago." Since he was testifying in 1867, this estimate could not have been correct. Under further questioning, he changed the date to 1849 but then said, Come to think over it, I didn't keep count, only thinking of the number of years. . . . I think I left before . . . the time of the great famine there [in Ireland] . I refer to the time that cargoes or ships laden with corn meal and other provisions were sent to that country from the United States . . . they were talking about the famine shortly after I came here.
Dermody also had trouble with age. At first he stated that "I can't tell [you when I was born] -got no family bible here -unless I go to Ireland for it, and that would take a long time." But he then claimed that he had been 28 in August, 1865. That would have made him about thirty when he testified. He followed that assertion with a guess that he had been "eighteen or under it" when he immigrated. There are in the United States many hundreds of Courts possessing the power to grant naturalization, and to require in any case that affirmative proof be offered that no one of such Courts has ever granted naturalization to a particular person, would be to require what is practically impossible. (220) Thus, the burden of proof was upon the immigrant to produce the papers he had been given by the court.
65. As an election inspector in Pennsylvania put it, "I don't know any better [how to identify foreigners] than by their dialect" (SR 1431: MD [no number, bound between 24 and 25] , 27).
66. Like any other document, these papers could be lost or destroyed. For example, Samuel T. Wilson of Green county, Kentucky, after reporting that he was "acquainted with Isaac Hartfield," went on to recall that from what he and his brother both told I know him to be a foreigner; he told me himself that he was born in Germany. . . . He told me that he had never been in court but once for that purpose [being naturalized] , and that was in 1852, in Louisville, Kentucky; that he took some kind of an oath and got some kind of paper at that time, but did not know whether it was a naturalization paper or not; that he did not now have it, nor did he have it at the August election; that his children had destroyed it. (SR 1063: MD 11, 402) United I guess I am twenty-eight, going on twentynine; I don't know which. I don't exactly know what year it was I came into this country. I have been here eight years, going on nine years . . . I expect I was about seventeen and a half years old when I came into this country, or thereabouts. I was under eighteen, I think, when I came into this country, but am not sure of it. I am not certain whether I am twenty-eight now or not. I never heard my brother, who is older than I am, say how old I was. I only think I was eighteen from what other people said about my age. According to my best opinion I was eighteen when I came to this country. I don't know in what year I came to this country. I may have been here eight, nine, ten, eleven, or twelve years . . . I don't know I am thirty years old. I don't think I have [been] in this country over eight or nine years. I feel pretty certain of this. I feel certain I am not younger than twenty-eight years old. I can only guess how old I was when I came to this country. I can't tell anything about my age within two or three years. I was not a gossoon when I came to this country; a boy sixteen or seventeen years old is out of his gossoon. The first day's work I ever did was on the railroad; I did a man's work . . . I was only here two or three days before I worked on the railroad. A man, in my opinion, of sixteen or seventeen, can do a man's work. I got a man's wages. They give men's wages to boys on the railroad. 68 Left to their own devices (as they were in this instance), election officials frequently projected estimates favorable to their party's interests. If allowed to proceed, these anonymous men were usually sworn as to the information they had provided, permitted to vote, and then vanished back into the vast, amorphous sea of humanity that American cities had become by the middle of the nineteenth century.
MENTAL COMPETENCY
One of the most difficult voting requirements to enforce involved mental competency. Most laws made "idiocy" a disqualification, although, even under the best of circumstances, idiocy was often hard to determine. And the late nineteenth century was not the best of circumstances; because there were very few psychiatrists or social workers in the United States, very few retarded adults had been officially identified as idiots. Even fewer had been identified as mentally ill. For these reasons, election judges had to fall back on their own judgment, strongly shaped by community norms and collective understandings of the mental abilities of prospective voters. It appears that they were far more reluctant to declare their neighbors insane (of normal intelligence but mentally unstable) than to view them as imbecilic.
In most cases, election judges applied two different kinds of standards. The most general standard was whether or not the voter was capable of handling his own affairs; this was a very broad and ambiguous test because most of the social transactions involved in normal lives were relatively simple. For example, many prospective voters with borderline mental capacities lived with their parents on farms and had little, if anything, to do with the outside community. The most complex social interaction they ever attempted was, in fact, facing the election judges when voting.
The second standard was a "rough and ready" intelligence test based on factual questions (e.g., who is president of the United States?, what year is this?) or mathematical problems (e.g., simple addition). Because so many voters were illiterate, an inability to read and write was never taken as evidence of idiocy. And, given the very low educational attainments of much of the population, the answers to factual questions or mathematical problems had to be interpreted carefully.
69 Sheer ignorance, for example, was not a disqualification for voting. But the inability to be educated, if the opportunity was offered, did constitute a disqualification.
In the vernacular at the polls, these categories usually descended into simpler concepts of "idiocy" and "insanity." In either case, election judges and challengers were almost always compelled to rely on a subjective understanding of the complex social history of the men who appeared at the polls. In a hearing held on the conduct of the August, 1859, election in Wayne county, Kentucky, for example, E.L. Van Winkle, a lawyer practicing in Monticello, was asked to assess the intelligence of three voters: George Payne, Chesley Holder, and William Wade. With reference to the "character of [Payne's] mind," Van Winkle testified that he was "somewhat" acquainted with him, having seen him often as I passed the road to Somerset and above; most generally have had something to say to him; he always calls for tobacco; seems to have no idea in regard to any matter except tobacco; he has little or no mind, in my judgment. I have, however, never given him a thorough examination; he acts and talks like an idiot.
Van Winkle was then asked: "Has Chesley Holder enough mind to distinguish the principles of the different parties and vote accordingly? Can or not either party vote him without trouble, when in their possession, because of his want of mind?" To which he answered that Holder has not sufficient understanding to comprehend the principles of any party, in my judgment. That is the case with a great many more. I think Holder is a man of such little intellect that he could be easily controlled, except where he has a prejudice against the person who seeks to manage him.
It is not clear just how many men Van Winkle would have disqualified among the "great many more" to whom he referred in his preceding answer, but he seemed to set a fairly high standard for competency. For one thing, he admitted that, as far as he knew, neither Payne nor Holder had ever "been condemned by any court of jurisdiction in this county as idiots." But the most revealing testimony came in response to questions raised as to "the character of the mind of . . . William Wade," whether or not he was "of sufficient understanding to discriminate between the principles of the parties?" Van Winkle responded that:
William Wade is a man of but little capacitybut a shade above idiocy. I heard a quarrel between him and Chesley Holder a few days ago, and thought there were two fools well met. Wade has but little knowledge of politics; some knowledge of men, and generally takes his stand early in the canvass and sticks to the end, without the shadow of changing. He generally comes to me for this ticket, and I have never known him to fail in voting it. He seems to be almost always opposed to the democracy, except Amos Kendall. I don't think him able to determine the principles of any party.
This surprised Van Winkle's questioner, who then asked, "Has or not William Wade been a mail carrier for many years in this county; if so, was he or not always regarded as a prompt and efficient one?" Van Winkle then admitted that "Wm. Wade has carried the mail for many years, and was always punctual in the discharge of his duty; at least that was his character; he traveled like a man who felt that he was on United States business." From these responses, Van Winkle appears to have been willing to disqualify, on grounds of deficient mental capacity, a man who was regularly employed by the U.S. Post Office and possibly literate (although carrying bulk mail between two points would not necessarily require an ability to read or write). He was then asked to compare the three men, each against the other, answering that "Wade and Holder both have some capacity; Payne has none, or almost none. Wade, as a mail-carrier, seems to have some considerable knowledge of the routine of business. I can't say that Holder could have any connected idea upon any one subject, except he seems to understand the ginseng question. 70. SR 1061: MD 3, 62-65. Although the reference to a "ginseng question" remains a bit of a mystery, the Encyclopaedia Britannica described ginseng in this way:
The root is frequently forked, and it is probably owing to this circumstance that medicinal properties were in first place attributed to it, its resemblance to the body of a man being supposed to indicate that it could restore virile power to the aged and impotent. Benjamin Compton offered similarly stern evaluations of his neighbors in the Price precinct of Pulaski county, Kentucky. Describing Thomas Langdon, whom he had known for "five or six years," Compton stated that he is generally considered an idiot or a very foolish person; he has not got capacity sufficient to vote; they have to give him a ticket; I could not call him a plumb idiot; his capacity is only moderate; he works some, and always has some one to manage him.
When asked if Langdon had the "capacity sufficient to attend work or business in such a way as to make his own living," Compton responded, "I would say not." However, Compton later conceded that, as far as he knew, Langdon was not "a State charge under the statute of Kentucky for the support of idiots." When asked if he had ever known "any one to make a trade for him [Langdon] , or to manage him in anything," Compton responded, "I do not know of any one making any trades for him. I do not know of any one managing any particular transaction for him." Compton was also asked to describe Franklin Bishop whom he had also known for five or six years, "He is not capable of doing hardly any business of any note, and was so at the last August election; he knocks about on the farm; he has hardly any capacity; his father sees to him."
His testimony then moved on to William Stewart whom he had known a little longer, "He is a man of hardly any capacity at all; he knocks about on the farm a little, but has to have some one to manage for him; this has been his condition as long as I have known him, and up to this time; he has a trustee or agent appointed by the court to attend to his business." However, Compton later conceded that he had never discussed any subject with Stewart but "only spoke to him when passing." He also confessed that he had never heard a third-hand report of a conversation between someone and Stewart, adding that "I don't think he talks much." This apparently frustrated Compton's questioner who then asked how he had come to "learn his want of capacity," whether "by phrenology, physiognomy, or report, or by guess, or in what way?" Compton responded, "I know from his acts and his appearance and looks that he is foolish." When compelled to concede that he had never "witnessed any business transaction with" Stewart, Compton asserted that "he never trades any." Compton then relayed that he judged Stewart to "be foolish" because he had "heard him talk some. . . . I never heard him talk with any one in particular. I was passing his house and heard him try to stop a horse, and he hallowed wo and way." This led the questioner to ask if "the horse [was] in the plough and he at the handles." Compton responded, that the "horse was in the plough. He was standing a short distance from him, but could not stop him." The horse, however, did not "run away" because Stewart's "father stopped him" when he "hallowed wo, and he stopped." Since this was both entirely normal behavior with an unruly horse and more or less exactly what Stewart had done before his father intervened, Compton had hardly proven his assertion that the man was incompetent. Later, Compton conceded that he had only "hearsay" knowledge that Stewart had ever had "a guardian appointed by the court to attend to his business."
71
Aside from the law, the community usually had several primary reasons to suspect the participation of men of low intelligence. One, of course, is that the mentally disabled did not understand or did not understand very well the issues involved in the election. That meant that their choices were either somewhat arbitrarily made or, worse, easily swayed by others. For example, Robert Grooms, a seventy year-old man in Zanesville, Ohio, appears to have received a dollar in return for voting the Republican ticket. But, although he seemed sincere in his attempts to relate what had happened at the polls, his testimony left some things in doubt. For one thing, when asked who he voted for, he said, "I run the full ticket out and out; I never marked a man on it." When asked what ticket that might have been, he replied, "I got the ticket at Jennings's blacksmith shop; I have no learning and don't know what ticket it was." He only knew that the party he intended to support was opposed to the Democratic candidate for Congress, although, even there, he could not describe any of the principles for which the party stood. "Well, I am hardly able to tell you; I've got no mind; my mind is distracted." He cast the ticket because "Three or four told me that if they were in my place they would vote that ticket; I would just as lief vote one as another." While no one had given him any whiskey, he did "suppose they gave me about a dollar in money." This must have been a very brief transaction because he did not "know all of them. Mr. Leslie gave me about a quarter himself; that's all I know about it."
After some discussion concerning the whereabouts of his wife and why he was not living with her, the questioning returned to the election. Grooms then claimed that "I was always a Democrat, ever since I had the first vote." However, when the Democratic attorney asked him why he had sold his vote, he said that "I didn't sell it . . . they just give me the money; I didn't ask them for it." Upon further questioning, Grooms claimed that he had not violated his principles by voting for the Republican congressional candidate. In fact, he could not even identify which party that candidate had belonged to. He was simply "no scholar at all; I don't know my A B C's" and had just "took the voice of the people -what they told me." Then, in another somewhat bewildering response, he reaffirmed his party allegiance. "I always had the Democrat's side, and thought it was as good as any. . . . I THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX 21 71. SR 1063: MD 11, 156-60. always voted the Democratic ticket ever since I had a vote -all, except old General Harrison; I voted for him." However, he did not know whether he had favored Jefferson Davis over Abraham Lincoln. "Well, I can't tell you; my mind is gone so; it is distracted." Later testimony suggested that the money Grooms had received might in fact have been a gift because he was disabled. In his own words, "I suppose they thought so. I am a cripple; can't do much." Thus what was apparently a routine bribery transaction in which an ostensibly Democratic voter had sold his suffrage for a dollar might have been, at the same time, an act of charity. Even so, Grooms probably could not have distinguished between the two interpretations of this arrangement. He was not even certain which ticket he had voted. 72 The other reason that the participation of those with weak mental capacities was usually discouraged was that their ethical compass, as understood in the community at large, was often somewhat skewed or even altogether missing. 73 In such cases, they could easily be bribed without, sometimes, even understanding that they had been illegally enticed. T.C. Brown, clerk of election at Mill Spring (No. 6 district) of Wayne county, related one such case. Asked if George Payne was "a fool," Brown replied, "Payne has no sense." He was then asked whether "Payne [can] be voted for a plug of tobacco or a pair of shoes?" Brown responded, "He can be voted for a small bribe; he once told me, in answer to my question as to whom he voted for, that he voted for the biggest pair of boots or shoes, I don't remember which, that was ever seen at Mill Springs."
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Almost all such men comprehended some things well enough to display at least some characteristics of normal intelligence. Under sustained questioning, however, their responses often revealed very serious contextual misunderstandings and fallacies that would have been obvious to any election official. For example, Peter Stonebriner, who voted in Newtonville, Ohio, might have passed muster upon a very brief, cursory inspection, but any lengthy interrogation would probably have disqualified him from voting. Here is how it went in the contested election hearing.
Stonebriner signed his testimony with his mark.
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CONCLUSION
The focus in this article has been upon ordinary men, some of whom rarely formed policy-related preferences, seldom studied party platforms, and could not recall the name of the candidates for whom they vot-THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX 23 75. SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 540-44 . This interrogation was immediately followed with another involving Hamilton McDaniel who proved to be a much brighter witness. Many of the questions were policy-oriented (e.g., on the tariff, repayment of the national debt, taxation of federal bonds, and black suffrage). However, he too signed with his mark.
ed. As in all things, men varied in their familiarity with the policy positions of candidates and party organizations. At one end of this distribution, many voters had only the dimmest understanding of what might have been at stake in an election.
76 Some, and likely more than a few, had almost no understanding of what they did.
We are particularly interested in these ordinary men for several reasons. First, their experiences reveal the multitude of ways in which men were incorporated into American politics. As has been suggested in the preceding pages, the networks and understandings that shaped their behavior at the polls defy any simple notion of "preference formation." For many men, for example, the act of voting was a social transaction in which they handed in a party ticket in return for a glass of whiskey, a pair of boots, or a small amount of money. While these transactions could be seen as simple bribery, the practices associated with these exchanges were, in fact, much more complex. As part of the social and political culture surrounding the polls, they were frequently embedded in long-term personal relationships between party agents and the men who voted; these relationships and their associated practices had become expectations in which, for instance, men came to think of themselves as Democrats because they were given things by men who worked for the Democratic party. In other words, the men who were given things had become Democrats precisely because they had come to expect to be given things by Democratic agents at the polls. Such men were not so much bribed as rewarded for their votes.
Other men came to the polls with friends and relatives who, for one reason or another, had strong preferences in the election. These friends and relatives pressured, cajoled, and otherwise persuaded these men to vote a particular ticket. Brothers, for example, sometimes "voted" their imbecilic siblings, in the process negotiating the necessary rituals for them (e.g., giving their name and residence to the judge of election). In other cases, fathers and brothers threatened "trouble in the family" if their sons and siblings voted wrong. In addition, men belonging to ethnic and religious communities monitored their fellow countrymen and coreligionists with social ostracism serving as the penalty for transgressing party lines.
77 Some employers, particularly landlords and farmers, watched how their employees voted, exploiting the asymmetries in their economic relationship. In army camps during the Civil War, soldiers cast their tickets into cigar boxes and tin cups laid out in front of the company commander's tents. In many of those camps, to vote for the Democratic party was viewed as a treasonous slur upon the valor of fallen comrades. In all these circumstances, men sometimes discovered subterfuges in which opposition party agents helped disguise, in one way or another, the ticket they cast at the polls.
There is a second reason we should be particularly interested in these men for whom the act of voting was not a simple transformation of a personal issue preference into an instrumental vote on government policy. The physical arrangement of the polling place, along with the official rituals governing the act of voting, provided more than the context in which men negotiated their transactions and intimidated their neighbors. This was also the site in which the great political economic issues of the day, such as secession, slavery, and civil war, were decided by men who conceived of their identities and interests in ethnocultural terms. From that perspective, analysis of practices in and around the mid-nineteenth-century polling place squarely addresses what might be considered the most central theoretical problem in the study of American political development: the very wide interpretive gulf between, on the one hand, political economic analysis of national policy decisions and, on the other, much more cultural explorations of voting participation by individual citizens. 78 24 RICHARD BENSEL 76. Although negotiations between party agents and voters were extremely common and often quite extended, they rarely involved discussions of public policy. One of the rare exceptions was reported by Francis S. Rowley as he described how Rinaldo Craig came to vote for the Republican candidate in the 1866 congressional election in Mount Vernon, Ohio:
He [Craig] said that he didn't care much who was elected, but that he would vote for Columbus Delano. Said if they would pay him a small sum he would vote for Morgan, provided his mother and step-father didn't find it out. I told him I wasn't buying votes myself. I thought that it was his duty to vote for Morgan, and that if he wanted to vote that way I thought he could vote without his mother finding it out. He said he was afraid that his mother would find it out. I told him to do just as he pleased; that it was his privilege. . . . I don't know as I assigned any reason, particularly [in urging Craig to vote for Morgan]. I told him I thought by voting for Delano he was placing a negro on an equality with a white man. . . . When it [the war] first broke out I was in favor of it; I wasn't in favor of it the last year or two. When Rowley was asked if he favored black civil and political rights "when our people were about to whip the rebels," he replied, "Not in the way they were carrying it on" (SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 207) . 77. How voters understood the relevance of party platforms to their individual life circumstances was often embedded in street-level competition between races, ethnic groups, or religious communities. For example, when James Wagoner of Zanesville, Ohio, was asked to describe the "difference between the principles" of the Democratic and Republican parties, he replied, "Well, I suppose one party goes for the niggers, and the other for the Union. If you don't get out of a nigger's way they will knock you off the sidewalk. They take up a white man quicker than they would a nigger." When asked if he thought "that the Union party is in favor of giving the negroes the right to vote," Wagoner replied, "They would, if they wouldn't be afeared of being called butternuts." Since "butternuts" was a slang term for southern sympathizers who were almost always Democrats, Wagoner had this connection wrong. When asked what he did for a living, Wagoner answered in a way that underscored his proletarian roots, "I haven't got any trade at all; I play the fiddle once in awhile; that's all the trade I've got; when I get into trouble I can play it out" (SR 1313: MD 38, pt. 2, 653) .
78. Ever since the emergence of the ethnocultural interpretaIn the middle of the nineteenth century, most national policy decisions could be readily connected to regional economic differences such as the extent of industrial manufacturing, prevailing interest rates, and dependence on commodity crop production. For the most part, congressmen and senators described themselves as responding to these differences when they voted and probably would have found political economic interpretations of their decisions as at least plausible, if not flattering. What they did and how they understood what they did were consistent and match up well with our much later scholarly perspective.
These interpretations can be profitably extended to the construction of state and national party platforms during the period. National economic issues dominated the declarations of state party conventions, both in frequency and in intensity. Slavery, the banking system, and tariff protection were, for example, among the most salient policy divisions between the Republican and Democratic parties during the mid-nineteenth century. Because political economic issues so dominated party competition during this period, we can easily extend our interpretation of national policy making down to the state level. Most congressmen and senators voted in accordance with the political economic characteristics of their constituencies because attentive party professionals, organized into state and district conventions, wanted them to.
The next step in an exploration of the roots of national policy making is the examination of election returns in order to see whether or not voters appear to have responded to the party platforms upon which congressional candidates ran. For political economists, this exploration is somewhat less satisfying than those involving congressional voting patterns and partisan policy declarations. For example, while most voters in industrial constituencies supported candidates favoring tariff protection, a sizable minority of the electorate, often more than 40 percent or so, also backed candidates supporting lower trade barriers. A somewhat similar pattern, although less striking (in that minorities were usually smaller), prevailed among agricultural districts. For example, significant fractions of the electorate in the southern cotton belt supported tariff protection in areas that could only have been harmed by trade barriers on manufactured goods. So, while broad electoral patterns are consistent with a political economic framework, the general picture is less clear than with congressional voting or party platforms.
The final step is to identify the microfoundations of national policy making. This takes us into an examination of the individuals who cast the votes that elected congressmen to office. This examination would investigate whether or not individual political opinions corresponded with partisan declarations on national policy issues. With respect to that correspondence, this article has focused on the American polling place, the physical space in which individual voters made their electoral choices. As has been shown, our information on these choices is usually both indirect and, from a political economic perspective, disappointing. It is indirect in the sense that what can usually be observed in the late nineteenth century is the way in which party organizations campaigned for office, including torchlight parades, stump speeches, banners and placards, and so forth. If we assume that parties knew what they were doing when they displayed party symbols and created popular slogans (in other words, that voters responded to such symbols and slogans), we must assume that their meaning played a significant role in the process through which voters formed their electoral choices. Viewed from this perspective, many voters, both on their own testimony and the circumstantial evidence available from other participants, must have responded to ideational constructs that had only a tan-
THE AMERICAN BALLOT BOX 25
tion of nineteenth-century voting almost four decades ago, the literature on nineteenth-century American politics has been almost schizophrenic. On the one hand, policy conflict has been viewed as the primary force driving party competition at both the federal and state levels as divisions over slavery, secession, the tariff, and the banking system shaped and reshaped alignments in the party system and legislation. On the other hand, popular participation in elections, whether as ritual display in political processions or as votes cast at the polls, has been interpreted as the expression of ethnic and cultural attitudes and loyalties, the latter having little to do with the policy conflicts that the parties contend with after the voting is completed. For examples of the literature from the policy
